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The linguistic construction of the self in narratives of obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) 
 
Abstract 
 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a mental health problem characterised by distressing 
obsessions and repetitive compulsions.  The autogenous-reactive model of OCD outlines two 
types of obsessions: 1) reactive obsessions, which are triggered by stimuli external to the self 
(e.g. electrical appliances) and 2) autogenous obsessions, which are triggered by stimuli 
internal to the self (e.g. thoughts or memories) (Lee and Kwon, 2003).  Recent research has 
highlighted that the role of the self may be different for the two kinds of obsession (Seo and 
Kwon, 2013).  The current study demonstrates the differences in the linguistic construction 
of the self within narratives about OCD episodes involving reactive and autogenous 
obsessions. Narratives told by people with OCD are analysed by focusing on the entity placed 
as grammatical subject.  It is found that, within autogenous narratives, personified thoughts 
and the mind are placed as grammatical subject more often than within reactive narratives.  
Moreover, when in subject position, the self performs more physical actions in reactive than 
autogenous narratives.  These patterns construct the self as agentive and responsible when 
the obsession concerns the surroundings, as in reactive obsessions, yet potentially in need of 
protection when the obsession contains implications for identity, as in autogenous 
obsessions. 
Keywords 
 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), autogenous-reactive, inference-based approach, 
narrative, linguistic analysis, self, personification  
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1. Introduction 
 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a debilitating mental health problem characterised 
by persistent, distressing obsessions and repetitive compulsions.  Very often a person with 
OCD will experience both obsessions and compulsions; however, obsessions can occur 
without compulsions, and vice versa (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Common 
obsessions include fears of contamination from germs, diseases or one’s own ‘immoral’ 
thoughts (often responded to through washing the hands, body or items perceived as 
contaminated), fears of causing a catastrophic event such as a fire or burglary through 
negligence (often responded to by checking electrical appliances and locks), fears of 
deliberately harming others (often responded to by avoiding the predicted victim) and fears 
of negative consequences if rituals such as counting or establishing patterns among items are 
not performed. 
In recent years, clinical approaches to OCD have begun to emphasise the importance 
of self-perception in the maintenance of the disorder and have tried to capture – through 
quantitative, inventory-based methods – how the role of the self may vary across different 
types of obsessions and compulsions (see Doron and Kyrios, 2005 for a review).  One cognitive 
model that implicates a sense of self is the inference-based approach to OCD (IBA) (O'Connor 
et al., 2005, O'Connor and Aardema, 2012, O'Connor and Robillard, 1995), which views a fear 
of the self as central in some types of obsessions.  Another is the autogenous-reactive model 
(AR) (Lee and Kwon, 2003), which describes OCD through a distinction between obsessions 
triggered internally and externally to the self.  Despite this focus on the self in quantitative, 
clinical research, there is little qualitative work exploring how the self is constructed in the 
everyday language of people with OCD, or the possible variation in the positioning of the self, 
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obsessions and wider experiences of OCD across different types of obsessions and 
compulsions.     
 Drawing on ideas from the AR model and the IBA, this study qualitatively explores the 
linguistic construction of the self, mental activity and a distrust of the senses within narratives 
told by people with OCD.  It is demonstrated that the self tends to be positioned differently 
within the narratives depending on the content of the obsession; and that the linguistic 
construction of one’s mind and one’s thoughts potentially varies depending on implications 
for one’s sense of self.  This study also argues for the utility of researching OCD experiences 
through qualitative methods. 
2. The self and OCD 
The role of the self in OCD is complex and multifaceted.  Clinical research based on the 
cognitive-behavioural model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985, 1989) has argued that the content of 
distressing thoughts is often interpreted as revealing undesirable aspects of one’s character, 
such as a tendency towards aggression or negligence (Rachman, 1997) despite the person not 
being aggressive, negligent or in any way wanting to perform the acts they have obsessed 
about.  The cognitive-behavioural model posits that nearly everybody will have distressing 
thoughts from time to time, thus it is not the occurrence of distressing thoughts per se that 
causes OCD.  Rather, distressing thoughts become obsessions through the person’s appraisal 
of those thoughts.  For example, a distressing thought such as the house might burn down can 
become an obsession if it is appraised in ways such as it’s my responsibility to ensure the house 
doesn’t burn down or I am a negligent and irresponsible person if the house burns down.  
Obsessions can thus pose a threat to the person’s perceptions of themselves (Bhar and Kyrios, 
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2007), with thoughts rated as more upsetting causing a higher level of damage to self-
perceptions (Rowa et al., 2005).   
Research has also found that obsessions experienced as severe by those with OCD 
tend to be thoughts that are strongly ego-dystonic (i.e. in opposition to the values and beliefs 
held by the person) (Purdon and Clark, 1999) and thoughts that threaten personally significant 
areas of experience (e.g. relationships) (Doron et al., 2012, Doron et al., 2013). Additionally, 
people whose obsessions contain ‘repugnant’ themes such as aggressive acts and sexual 
deviance (Moulding et al., 2014) often experience a fear of the self, and are more likely to 
reach negative conclusions about themselves based on their thoughts compared to anxiety 
disorder and non-clinical controls (Ferrier and Brewin, 2005).  Thus, research into self-
perceptions and the ways in which obsessions can threaten a positive sense of self or 
reinforce a negative sense of self can help to shed light on the nuances of the role of the self 
in OCD and potentially inform treatment providers of possible strategies for addressing this 
sensitive issue. Research into the role of the self in OCD has been a central part of the 
development of two, more recent cognitive models of OCD than the cognitive-behavioural 
model - the autogenous-reactive (AR) model and the inference-based approach (IBA). 
2.1. The autogenous-reactive model 
The AR model (Lee and Kwon, 2003, Lee et al., 2005) categorises OCD into two broad groups 
based on the content of the obsessions: reactive and autogenous.  Examples of reactive 
obsessions include thoughts of contamination and accidents (e.g. fire) through negligence. 
These thoughts are not necessarily ego-dystonic and they are triggered by tangible stimuli 
that are external to the self; they also tend to lead to overt compulsions (such as washing or 
checking). In contrast, examples of autogenous obsessions include sexual, immoral, 
blasphemous or aggressive themes.  These thoughts are strongly ego-dystonic and are not 
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sparked by external triggers; instead, they are often activated by memories, mental images 
and other thoughts that are experienced as an ‘internal’ part of one’s self. The person often 
attempts to remove these thoughts through covert compulsions (such as mental rituals) or 
there may be no compulsions at all. 
 The difference between the role of the self in reactive and autogenous obsessions is 
perhaps the key element of the AR model.  Whereas reactive obsessions involve the person’s 
immediate surroundings and are concerned with predictions about external events, 
autogenous obsessions involve an introspective interpretation of the significance of the 
obsessions for one’s self (Seo and Kwon, 2013). Unsurprisingly, then, recent work on the AR 
model has shown how autogenous obsessions are more closely related to negative appraisals 
of the self and are typically accompanied by a strong sense of guilt or shame (Seo and Kwon, 
2013).  In this study, qualitative linguistic analysis of descriptions of OCD episodes are 
analysed to provide new, fine-grained insights that support these differences between the 
experiences of the self in reactive and autogenous obsessions.   
2.2. The inference-based approach 
Another model that examines the self in OCD is the IBA.  In the IBA, obsessions are seen as 
doubts that are “created and maintained by the client’s way of reasoning” (O'Connor and 
Aardema, 2012, O'Connor et al., 2005).  From this perspective, an OCD episode always starts 
with an initial doubt, which often takes the form of maybe or perhaps.  The doubt then leads 
to a conditional hypothesis, which often takes the form of if p, then q.  For example, a person’s 
triggering stimulus could be leaving the house, the doubt could be maybe I left the stove on 
and the resulting hypothesis could be if I left the stove on, then the house might burn down 
(O'Connor, 2002). 
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 The IBA claims that doubts are formed through reasoning about prior, similar 
situations rather than by using evidence in the actual, present situation (O'Connor et al., 
2005).  In terms of OCD with overt compulsions (which largely overlap with reactive 
obsessions in the AR model), responses to the doubt are thus ineffective because, even 
though they are enacted in reality, they are essentially an attempt to modify an imagined, 
fictive situation (O'Connor and Robillard, 1995).  In relation to obsessions that have strong 
consequences for a sense of self (i.e. autogenous obsessions in the AR model or repugnant 
obsessions in the IBA), the doubt surrounds a “possible cognitive or mental state of affairs” 
(Aardema and O'Connor, 2007) (e.g. I might be a paedophile). These obsessions are self-
referential, that is, they hold negative evaluations about what the self might be or could 
become in the future (Aardema and O'Connor, 2007, Aardema et al., 2013). With links to 
Possible Selves theory (Markus and Nurius, 1986), the IBA model thus argues that, for people 
with these kinds of ego-dystonic obsessions, the self is conceptualised as able to take on 
different characteristics and become something quite far removed from the current self.  
Therefore, in the IBA, autogenous or repugnant obsessions are driven by a fear of the self-as-
could-be; the person becomes over-invested in this possible self and heavily distrusts the real, 
self-as-is (Aardema and O'Connor, 2007). However, as this self-as-could-be is an imagined 
self; the person is investing and believing in hypothetical situations.   
2.3.  Language, OCD and the self 
In recent discourse studies, the ways in which people with OCD linguistically represent the 
disorder as acting independently to the self has been demonstrated.  For example, Fennell 
and Liberato’s (2007) study of responses from people with OCD to written interview questions 
demonstrates how OCD is often constructed as a threatening entity such as a “shark”. 
Similarly, Knapton and Rundblad (2018) analyse written descriptions of OCD episodes to 
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argue that people with OCD personify not only the disorder, but also the mind, obsessions 
and emotions. The linguistic constructions of these externalised entities are structured by 
metaphors of movement that endow the mental entities with characteristics of agency and 
influence.  For example, one participant writes that “it’s ideas in my head that spark OCD 
behaviour most”, thus bestowing his “ideas” with the ability to start an OCD episode, rather 
than attributing these ideas to an explicit agency of his self (Knapton and Rundblad, 2018).  
Despite this seeming importance of personification for OCD, no studies have examined how 
the use of personification may vary across different obsessions in OCD.  
In the current study, linguistic constructions of the self as well as the mind, thoughts, 
emotions and the disorder are analysed within narratives of OCD episodes. While these 
various elements of OCD can be constructed in language as acting autonomously from the 
self, it is not necessarily the case that the person conceptualises these elements as entirely 
separate from the self.  It may be that the person conceptualises these elements as 
distinguishable parts within a holistic self or, indeed, that the self is always at once all of these 
elements combined.  Moreover, it is possible that the same linguistic constructions signify 
alternative conceptualisations of the self for different participants.  Thus, while this study 
analyses the linguistic construction of the self with OCD, the study does not make claims 
about what conceptualisations of the self can be read from the language for each participant 
nor does it argue that there are one-to-one correspondences between linguistic features and 
conceptualisations of self. 
3. OCD and narrative 
As OCD episodes move through a cycle with several possible stages (i.e. from a triggering 
situation to an obsession, an appraisal, distress, a compulsion and resolution (Salkovskis, 
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1985)), it has been argued that they have a sequential structure that forms a narrative when 
they are recounted in language (Knapton, 2016a).  However, this sequence is not to suggest 
that OCD episodes are linear; in fact, the stages of an OCD episode may not occur in a strict 
chronological order, they may be repeated several times in one episode, or they may overlap. 
Some people with OCD may not experience both obsessions and compulsions, and so the 
cycle does not have to contain all the possible stages in one episode.  Moreover, the 
resolution of one cycle may or may not be followed by another cycle.  As OCD episodes do 
occur frequently, their narrative reconstruction is often one that emphasises the repeated, 
ongoing and time-consuming nature of the obsessions and compulsions (Knapton, 2016a).  By 
analysing the tellings of OCD episodes as narratives, the dynamic nature of doubting and 
reasoning can be captured as they evolve throughout the sequence.  In this approach, OCD 
episodes are therefore regarded as holistic units that shift and fluctuate as they progress 
(Knapton, 2016b), which allows the subjective, idiosyncratic connections between doubts, the 
self and one’s mental activity to come to the fore.  It is clear from the claims of the IBA model 
that features of language, such as conditionals (e.g. if… then, unless) and modals (e.g. might, 
possibly), play an active role in constructing doubt and reasoning in OCD.  While there is now 
some work exploring the semantic features of language as used by people with OCD 
(Hartman, 2018, Knapton, 2016a), there is little discussion of whether linguistic features may 
serve different functions when recounting OCD episodes containing different kinds of 
obsessions and compulsions.  Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to capture the functions 
of these linguistic features through quantitative methods alone.  Thus, to explore reasoning 
processes and the construction of the self, it is necessary to include qualitative methods that 
take individual subjectivity into account.   
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4. Systemic-functional approach to grammar 
To analyse the linguistic construction of self, this paper draws on systemic-functional 
grammar (SFG) (Halliday, 1978, Halliday, 1985, Halliday and Hasan, 1985, Martin and Rose, 
2003), which is an approach specifically designed for analysing grammar as it is used in 
different contexts and for different purposes. The key tenet of SFG is that it is not just our 
choice of words, but also our choice of grammar, that contributes to meaning (Halliday, 1978, 
Halliday, 1985).  
Discourse studies that apply SFG generally agree that the information provided at the 
beginning of a clause is the departure point of that utterance; in other words, it tells the 
listener/reader what that clause is going to be about.  This departure point is known as the 
‘theme’ of the clause (Halliday, 1985). By definition, the theme of the clause runs from the 
beginning of the clause up to and including the first element that tells us something about the 
content, that is either a participant involved in the action (i.e. a noun phrase), the process 
performed (i.e. a verb phrase) or a piece of background information (usually a prepositional 
phrase or adverbial) (Halliday, 1985).  For example, in the clause I left the stove on, the theme 
is I as this is the first element of the clause that gives some content (i.e. the participant 
involved). In the clause last week I left the stove on, the theme is last week, again because this 
is the first element of the clause that provides content (i.e. background information about the 
time).  However, we see that it is only in the clause I left the stove on that the theme (I) is the 
same as the grammatical subject. 
As English has a subject-verb-object clause structure, spoken conversational 
utterances tend to begin with the grammatical subject or with a conjunction (e.g. and, but, 
so, which are not classified as content words) followed by the grammatical subject.  Thus, in 
spoken language, the theme is very often the information that is placed in the subject position 
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of the clause.   In brief, for spoken conversational language, the grammatical subject and the 
theme are very often one and the same.  Therefore, if we analyse the themes of spoken 
utterances, it is likely that we will also be analysing the grammatical subjects.  Changing the 
information in the grammatical subject can thus create a different focus for the clause.  For 
example, the clause my thoughts overwhelm me signals that the clause is about my thoughts 
by placing this noun phrase as the theme of the clause (i.e. at the beginning), which in this 
case also places it in subject position. A passive clause such as I am overwhelmed by my 
thoughts would signal that the clause is about the self, who is positioned as the theme 
through the pronoun I. Again, the theme is also the grammatical subject.  Therefore, through 
varying the entity in subject position, the speaker can alter the departure point of the clause 
and thus signify different topics.  Examining spoken language used by people with OCD can 
allow an investigation into which entities are frequently placed in the subject position, and 
thus are likely to be the speaker’s focus of that clause. Considering the differences in the 
perceptions of self between people with reactive and autogenous obsessions, it is possible 
that there may be differences between the kind of entities placed in the subject position 
within the themes of clauses and the ways in which they highlight, or not, the role of self.   
5. Aims 
To recap, this study aims to show how doubting, the self and mental activities are linguistically 
constructed in narratives of OCD episodes.  By examining the entities placed in subject 
position within the themes of clauses, the ways in which the self is positioned differently in 
narratives of autogenous and reactive episodes are demonstrated. Quantitative overviews of 
results are presented in addition to qualitative analysis of one reactive narrative and one 
autogenous narrative, which have been selected for their illustrative nature. 
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6. Methods 
6.1. Ethical approval 
This study was granted ethical approval by the King’s College London Social Sciences, 
Humanities and Law research ethics sub-committee (Ref: SSHL/10/11-4).  Pseudonyms were 
used at all stages from transcription to publication. 
6.2. Recruitment and participants 
Two charities in the UK (OCD Action and OCD-UK) uploaded a recruitment advert onto their 
websites and then potential participants contacted the researcher directly.  Participants had 
to be age 18 or over and speak English fluently. Every participant had a clinical diagnosis of 
OCD, and participants were not excluded if they had diagnoses of additional mental health 
problems.  Fifteen participants with OCD were recruited between July 2011 and December 
2011; demographic information can be found in Table 1.   
Table 1: Demographic information of participants 
 Gender Age Ethnicity Occupational status* 
1 F 39 White UK/ 
White non-UK 
unemployed 
2 M 34 Not stated unemployed 
3 F 35 White UK full time parent 
4 F 48 White UK full time parent 
5 F 23 Not stated student 
6 F 24 White UK student 
7 F 46 White UK student 
8 M 56 White UK sales & customer service 
9 M 36 White UK skilled trade 
10 F 30 White UK administrative & secretarial 
11 F 33 White UK administrative & secretarial 
12 F 33 White UK administrative & secretarial 
13 M 31 White UK associate professional & technical 
14 F 36 White UK professional 
15 M 41 White UK professional 
* An open-ended question was used to ask for participants’ occupations.  Where stated, occupations were 
classified according to the British Standard Occupational Classification 2010 (Office for National Statistics (ONS)) 
and using the Occupation Coding Tool (Office for National Statistics (ONS)). 
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6.3. Data collection 
Each participant completed an audio-recorded, semi-structured interview with the author of 
this article.  Open-ended questions about the participants’ experiences of OCD, the onset of 
OCD and public perceptions of OCD were asked in the interviews.  All participants gave written 
informed consent to be interviewed.   
6.4. Data selection 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim and then recounted narratives of OCD episodes 
were identified from the transcripts.  Few recounted episodes included details about all the 
possible stages in the OCD cycle (e.g. situation, obsession, etc.); for example, some episodes 
only included details about two stages, some about three stages and so on.  For a stretch of 
language to be classified as a narrative, the participant needed to recount details of at least 
two of the stages in the OCD episode cycle so that a temporal link between stages could be 
identified. This also ensured that narratives about OCD episodes involving obsessions without 
compulsions, or compulsions without obsessions, would still be identified as narratives if they 
recounted details of at least two stages (e.g. the trigger and the obsession).   This 
identification process gave a total of 254 narratives (Table 2).   
To select the narratives for analysis, only those narratives that included details about 
a situation/trigger, an obsession and a compulsion were retained, which gave a total of 36 
narratives (Table 2). These narratives were then classified into autogenous and reactive 
narratives based on the content of the recounted obsession; this process gave 25 reactive 
narratives and 11 autogenous narratives for analysis (Table 2). While one participant (Susan) 
recounted narratives about reactive obsessions and autogenous obsessions, all other 
participants only told narratives of either autogenous or reactive obsessions. As autogenous 
episodes are by nature more likely than reactive episodes not to involve compulsions, it could 
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be that the selection criteria (i.e. requiring details of a trigger, an obsession and a compulsion) 
led to fewer autogenous narratives than reactive narratives being selected for analysis.  
However, as a percentage of each participant’s total number of narratives, there is no 
significant difference between the number of autogenous and reactive narratives selected for 
analysis, which suggests that there are fewer autogenous narratives in the data set overall.  
Table 2: No. OCD episode narratives per participant 
 No. narratives containing trigger, 
obsession and compulsion 
No. additional 
narratives 
Total no. narratives 
Reactive Autogenous 
Susan  3 2  12  17 
Nicola  4 - 22 26 
Jessica  3 -  18 21 
Clive  3 -  18 21 
Deana  3 -  17 20 
Angela  3 -  14 17 
Michelle  2 -  15 17 
Sarah  2 -  6 8 
Kelly  1 -  17 18 
Gary  1 -  16 17 
Vicky  - 3  18 21 
Matt  - 3  8 11 
Lucy  - 1  13 14 
Michael  - 1  12 13 
Ben  - 1  12 13 
Sub-total  25 11 - - 
Total 36  218 254 
 
6.5. Data analysis 
The 36 selected narratives were analysed using tools from SFG (Halliday, 1985) that focus on 
the entities in subject position within themes and the processes represented by the verb 
phrase.  Each narrative was broken down into clauses, and these clauses were entered into a 
spreadsheet (see Figure 1 for examples). For each clause, the theme (i.e. the content 
information that comes first) was identified.  Next, the grammatical subject was identified 
and, where the grammatical subject was not also part of the theme, the clause was discarded.   
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It is perhaps due to the nature of interview data that the grammatical subject was part of the 
theme in almost all clauses. For non-finite clauses where the syntax allows an ellipted subject, 
the subject was retrievable from the preceding clause.   Finally, the verb phrase was also 
identified (Figure 1).   
Following Rundblad (2007), the entity in subject position was coded according to its 
semantic meaning.  For example, the pronoun I was coded as ‘self’, and lexical items such as 
thoughts, mind and fears were coded as ‘mental and emotional entities’.  Similarly, drawing 
on the principles of SFG (Halliday, 1985) (but using adapted terminology), the process 
represented by the verb phrase was also coded according to semantic meaning.  For example, 
verbs such as check and wash were coded as ‘physical’ processes, and verbs such as think, 
convince and remember were coded as ‘cognitive’ processes (also Figure 1). The frequencies 
of all entities in subject position and all processes in the verb phrases were then summarised 
in tables.   
Figure 1: Clause breakdown and semantic coding 
 
In the English language, it is not always the case that the entity in subject position is 
performing the process encoded in the verb phrase.  For example, in passive voice (e.g. I am 
overwhelmed by my thoughts), it is I who is the subject but it is my thoughts who are 
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performing the process of ‘overwhelming.’  Thus, for the analysis, when examining which 
entities are in subject position, passive clauses are included; however, when examining which 
processes are performed by the entities in subject position, passive clauses are removed as it 
is not the entity in subject position that is performing the process in a passive voice.   
7. Results 
Throughout these results, quantitative overviews of the 36 narratives will be provided; all raw 
frequencies represent the number of clauses.  In total, the 36 narratives comprise 1095 
clauses in which the grammatical subject is part of the theme (reactive = 715; autogenous = 
380) with an average of 30 clauses per narrative (Table 3). 
Table 3: No. clauses in which the subject is part of the theme per participant for reactive and 
autogenous narratives 
 Reactive Autogenous 
Susan 138 35 
Nicola 146 - 
Deana 74 - 
Michelle 68 - 
Clive 67 - 
Angela 66 - 
Jessica 65 - 
Sarah 48 - 
Kelly 34 - 
Gary 9 - 
Matt - 149 
Vicky - 114 
Michael - 35 
Lucy - 27 
Ben - 20 
Sub-total 715 380 
Total 1095 
 
In addition to the quantitative overviews presented above and in later analyses, one reactive 
narrative (recounted by Michelle) and one autogenous narrative (recounted by Matt) that 
clearly exemplify the construction of the self, mental activity and doubt are presented here 
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as case studies (see Mitchell, 1984).  The two narratives show some similarities in that they 
are both characterised by a knowledgeable, rational self who is positioned in opposition to 
the OCD obsessions and behaviours.  Moreover, in both narratives, the mind or brain is 
constructed as an entity that is independent to the rational self and able to override one’s 
senses and common sense.  However, as will be shown through an examination of subject 
positioning, the focus on the self and the personified mind or brain is dissimilar across the 
two narratives, largely due to differences in implications for one’s values and sense of self. 
The two narratives are provided here in full. 
7.1. The example narratives 
7.1.1. Reactive 
 
In the reactive narrative that follows, Michelle describes her doubts about leaving electrical 
appliances plugged in and her subsequent checking compulsions.   
(1)              at home  
(2)  I suppose I get concerned about-  
(3)  there’s a particular socket that I plug my laptop into  
(4)  that is causing me some problems at the moment  
(5)  where I just don’t trust myself to unplug it properly  
(6)  and so typically my last thought-  
(7)  I check this blinking plug socket before I go to bed  
(8)  and my last thought is “I can see it’s switched off  
(9)  I can see there’s no plug in there”  
(10) the sensible part of me knows that that is switched off  
(11) but then I’m thinking “what if that’s not what I’m seeing  
(12) what if I’m thinking about a memory of having seen it’s switched off  
(13) and my brain is putting that where I think- you know in place of what I’m 
 seeing”  
(14) and so I kind of have to stand there  
(15) and count as I’m staring at it 
(16) generally to number 5  
(17) I like the number 5  
(18) but obviously that doesn’t help because I do it every day and every night  
(19) so then every night becomes the same  
(20) so there’s not only you know “do I not trust that it’s unplugged”  
(21) but “am I remembering the last time I counted and checked it”    
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(22) so it’s general thoughts that I can’t trust what I see  
(23) that I’m convinced that my brain sometimes plays tricks on me even though I 
 know it doesn’t 
(24) but what if it did this time 
(25) that’s kind of fairly typical 
 
In Michelle’s narrative, the key doubt expressed in conditional constructions is “but then I’m 
thinking “what if that’s not what I’m seeing/what if I’m thinking about a memory of having 
seen it’s switched off/and my brain is putting that… in place of what I’m seeing” (lines 11-13). 
The repeated use of the phrase “what if” opens up the possibility that her memories of past 
sightings can become projected into her present situation.  Thus, in line with the IBA, Michelle 
is confusing a feared situation with the actual situation at hand.  
 
7.1.2. Autogenous 
 
In the following autogenous narrative, Matt describes his doubts about negative thoughts 
becoming ingrained in his value system and the mental compulsions he performs.  
 
(1)              I know certain things that will bother me  
(2)  and almost like kind of- 
(3)  my mind 
(4)  knowing those things that bother me  
(5)  it’s almost kind of like going out of its way to focus on those  
(6)  it’s that cliché of don’t think about a pink elephant  
(7)  naturally you’re going to think about a pink elephant  
(8)  so it’s kind of going after those things that annoy me the most  
(9)  it could be a variety of things  
(10) and so it comes out as intrusive thoughts  
(11) and my primary fear is  
(12) I mean even though I know it’s intrusive  
(13) even though I know it’s that thing of I’m kind of almost making them come 
 out  
(14) the perennial fear is that if I don’t deal with them 
(15) that they will somehow become part of what I actually believe 
(16) so if it’s an intrusive thought where it’s say something negative about 
 somebody  
(17) that unless I find a way of neutralising it  
(18) or tackling it  
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(19) or getting rid of it 
(20) say by going through reasons to disprove it 
(21) that it will then sort of become embedded in my psyche as that is what I 
 actually do think 
 
In Matt’s narrative, the key hypothesis expressed in conditionals comes in lines 14-16: “the 
perennial fear is that if I don’t deal with them [negative thoughts]/that they will somehow 
become part of what I actually believe”.  Matt’s doubts are therefore about the nature of his 
core beliefs and values, and he positions his real, ‘authentic’ self as susceptible to damage 
from negative, unwanted thoughts. In line with the IBA, Matt is confusing a feared or 
undesirable version of himself with his actual self.  The conjunctions “if” and “unless” 
construct the removal of the negative thoughts as the only viable way that Matt can protect 
his acceptable, real self.  
The results now present the quantitative and qualitative linguistic patterns found 
when examining the entities in subject position. 
7.2. Overview of subject position 
Across all narratives, it can be seen that autogenous narratives contain more mental and 
emotional entities in subject position (19.7%, n=75/380) than reactive narratives (2.8%, 
n=20/715) (Table 4).  Additionally, reactive narratives contain more items in the environment 
in subject position (13.1%, n=94/715) than autogenous narratives (7.1%, n=27/380), as well 
as more other people in subject position (reactive: 10.3%, n=74/715; autogenous: 5.5%, 
n=21/380) (Table 4).  These linguistic patterns provide potential evidence for the contrasting 
foci of autogenous and reactive episodes as posited by the AR model.  Whereas autogenous 
narratives focus on thoughts and other ‘internal’ elements, reactive narratives focus on 
objects and people in the immediate surroundings.  The frequency of the self in subject 
position is not vastly different between reactive and autogenous narratives, however, as will 
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be shown in subsequent analyses, the processes performed by the self do differ across the 
two groups.  
Table 4: Entity in subject position 
Subject Reactive: all 
narratives 
Autogenous: all 
narratives 
Reactive: 
Michelle’s 
narrative 
Autogenous: 
Matt’s narrative 
n % n % n % n % 
Self 
 
426 59.6 206 54.2 30 63.8 13 37.1 
Mental and 
emotional 
entities 
20 2.8 75 19.7 5 10.6 12 34.3 
Items in the 
environment 
94 13.1 27 7.1 6 12.8 4 11.4 
Other people 
 
74 10.3 21 5.5 - - - - 
Dummy 
subject (e.g. 
generic it) 
101 14.1 51 13.4 6 12.8 6 17.1 
Total 
 
715 100.0 380 100.0 47 100.0 35 100.0 
 
When looking at the entities placed in the subject position in Michelle’s and Matt’s narratives 
(Table 4), we see that Michelle places her self as subject in 63.8% (n=30/47) of clauses, 
compared to Matt’s 37.1% (n=13/35). Additionally, Matt places his mental and emotional 
entities as subject in 34.3% (n=12/35) of clauses, compared to Michelle’s 10.6% (n=5/47).  
These figures echo the overall quantitative patterns as, within Matt’s autogenous narrative, 
the focus of the clauses is mental and emotional entities more often than in Michelle’s 
reactive narrative.  In contrast, within Michelle’s narrative, the focus of the clauses is the self 
more often than in Matt’s narrative. 
7.3. The self as subject  
 
Looking at the self as subject across all narratives (Table 5), we can see that the self is 
constructed differently across the two groups.  We find that the self in subject position is 
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more likely to perform a physical process in reactive narratives (56.5%, n=239/423) than 
autogenous narratives (43.8%, n=89/203). In autogenous narratives, the self is more likely to 
perform a being process (14.8%, n=30/203) than in reactive narratives (8.0%, n=34/423), as 
well as more likely to perform a cognitive process (autogenous: 30.5%, n=62/203; reactive: 
21.7%, n=92/423) (Table 5). Here, the linguistic patterns again align with the AR model by 
suggesting that autogenous episodes focus on a stable sense of self (i.e. through ‘being’ 
processes) that exists in a delicate relationship with thoughts and the mind (i.e. thinking 
processes).  In contrast, reactive episodes concern the physical actions of the self, thus 
highlighting the role of the self as attempting to manage the physical stimuli in the 
surroundings. 
Table 5: Processes performed when the self is in subject position  
Process 
(verb) 
Reactive: all 
narratives* 
Autogenous: all 
narratives** 
Reactive: 
Michelle’s 
narrative 
Autogenous: 
Matt’s narrative 
n % n % n % n % 
Be/exist 34 8.0 30 14.8 - - - - 
Physical 239 56.5 89 43.8 9 30.0 7 53.8 
Cognitive 92 21.7 62 30.5 11 6.7 6 23.1 
Emotional 44 10.4 17 8.4 3 10.0 - - 
Senses 14 3.3 5 2.5 7 23.3 - - 
Total 423 100.0 203 100.0 30 100.0 13 100.0 
*3 passive clauses removed from all reactive narratives 
**3 passive clauses removed from all autogenous narratives 
 
Comparing the processes performed by the self in Michelle’s and Matt’s narratives (Table 5), 
we can see in Michelle’s reactive narrative that the self is constructed as performing a range 
of processes that come from the semantic domains of physical action, cognition, emotion and 
the senses.  In contrast, when Matt’s self is the subject, he is only represented as performing 
processes from the semantic domains of physical action and cognition.  Matt’s narrative 
follows the overall autogenous patterns by containing a strong focus on the self as thinking. 
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On the other hand, Michelle’s narrative perhaps diverges from the overall reactive patterns 
by constructing the self not only as physically acting but also using her senses to monitor the 
surroundings. 
For Michelle, the processes performed by her self occur throughout all stages of her 
OCD episode.  For example, her physical actions (30.0%; n=9/30) are apparent in the initial 
trigger stage (“I check this blinking plug socket before I go to bed”, line 7) as well as the 
subsequent compulsions (“I kind of have to stand there/and count as I’m staring at it”, lines 
14-15). Similarly, her obsessions are also constructed with phrases that place her self in the 
subject position, such as “but then I’m thinking” (line 14) and “I’m convinced that” (line 23), 
which recognise Michelle’s own agency in her thought creation.  The placement of Michelle’s 
self as subject throughout all stages of the narrative constructs Michelle as maintaining 
agency as the episode progresses. In contrast, Matt does not place his self in the subject 
position at all when describing his triggers and the onset of the episode.  In fact, 53.8% 
(n=7/13) of Matt’s processes describe some sort of compulsion (e.g. “I find a way of 
neutralising it”, line 17), compared to 23.3% (n=7/30) of Michelle’s processes. 
 Michelle’s narrative depicts her self as highly interactive with the space and objects 
around her.  In particular, she uses her sight (23.3%; n=7/30) to measure the safety of her 
surroundings; for example, “I can see it’s switched off” (line 8) and “I’m staring at it” (line 15). 
The dependency on her senses situates Michelle as strongly embedded within the physical 
location of her OCD episode (in this instance, her “home”, line 1). Her senses thus allow her 
to monitor the external environment whilst simultaneously tying her to that location.  Despite 
the visual evidence, Michelle describes a distrust in her senses (10.0%; n=3/30); for example, 
“I can’t trust what I see” (line 22).  Although the verb “trust” and the verb “see” are both 
conjugated with the self as subject, Michelle constructs a division here between two parts of 
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her self: a trusting part and a seeing part.  Michelle’s doubting sequence (lines 11-13) unfolds 
because the judgement made by the (dis-)trusting part of her self is strong enough to 
overpower the evidence from the biological, seeing part of her self.  Again, there is a contrast 
here between Michelle’s narrative and Matt’s narrative.  Matt does not describe his senses 
or any interactions with the environment around him at all; rather, his episode is constructed 
as independent of location and external triggers. 
 Within both Michelle’s and Matt’s narratives, the verb “know” is largely used with the 
self in subject position. For example, Michelle says “even though I know it [the brain] doesn’t 
[play tricks on me]” (line 23) and, similarly, Matt says “even though I know it’s that thing of 
I’m kind of almost making them [the thoughts] come out” (line 13). For both Michelle and 
Matt, the grammatical pattern of the conjunction “even though” plus the self in subject 
position plus the verb “know” constructs the self as aware of an ‘objective’ reality that stands 
in opposition to their obsessions. The verb “know” also implies certainty; thus, by placing the 
self as subject, the self is positioned as possessing certain, stable knowledge that contrasts to 
the uncertainty and spiralling doubts within their thoughts.    
7.4. Mental and emotional entities as subject  
 
When mental and emotional entities are depicted as performing processes other than those 
of being or existing, these entities are bestowed qualities of agency and action, and are thus 
personified.  The construction of mental entities as able to think and act independently 
externalises the entities from the self, and there is evidence for this in both autogenous and 
reactive narratives. Overall, autogenous narratives do contain more personified mental and 
emotional entities in subject position than reactive narratives (autogenous: 8.2%, n= 31/380; 
reactive: 1.8%, n = 13/715). 
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While the number of clauses with mental and emotional entities as subject (both 
personified and literal) is small (n=90 without passives), we can still see from a descriptive 
overview (Table 6) that mental and emotional entities in both reactive and autogenous 
narratives are personified through performing physical actions (reactive= 65.0%, n=13/20; 
autogenous = 34.3%, n=24/70). In contrast, it is only within autogenous narratives that mental 
and emotional entities are personified through performing cognitive and emotional processes 
(i.e. thoughts, minds and emotions that can think and feel of their own accord). Thus, it 
appears that personified entities are constructed as performing a wider range of processes in 
autogenous than reactive narratives. 
Table 6: Processes performed when mental and emotional entities are in subject position  
Process (verb) Reactive: all 
narratives 
Autogenous: 
all narratives* 
Reactive: 
Michelle’s 
narrative 
Autogenous: 
Matt’s 
narrative** 
n % n % n % n % 
Be/exist 7 35.0 39 55.7 1 20.0 5 45.5 
Personifi-
cation 
Physical 13 65.0 24 34.3 4 80.0 5 45.5 
Cognitive - - 3 4.3 - - 1 9.1 
Emotional - - 4 5.7 - - - - 
Senses - - - - - - - - 
Total 20 100.0 70 100.0 5 100.0 11 100.0 
* 5 passive clauses removed from all autogenous narratives 
** 1 passive clause removed from Matt’s narrative 
 
Examples of personified mental and emotional entities are evident in Michelle’s narrative 
(8.5%; n=4/47) and Matt’s narrative (17.1%; n=6/35) (Table 6).  However, the ways in which 
the personified entities are constructed in the narratives is qualitatively different.   
In Matt’s narrative, personification is primarily used to situate his mind and his 
thoughts as entities that are highly autonomous. Through subject positioning, Matt constructs 
his mind as an extremely agentive entity that causes him distress through deliberate and 
considered action (e.g. “my mind/knowing those things that bother me/it’s almost kind of like 
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going out of its way to focus on those”, lines 3-5).  Similarly, Michelle’s personification of her 
“brain” (e.g. “I’m convinced that my brain sometimes plays tricks on me”, line 23) constructs 
it as a highly disruptive agent that is actively working against her to override the contradictory 
evidence from her senses.  
 Despite this similarity across narratives of a mind or brain constructed as independent, 
there are differences in the processes performed by the mind or brain.  In Matt’s narrative, 
his mind creates his obsessions.  He describes his mind as “going after those things that annoy 
[him] the most” (line 8), which gives the result that “it comes out as intrusive thoughts” (line 
10).  Therefore, through subject positioning, Matt’s mind is constructed as having powerful 
control over his obsessions, and his own role in the production of his obsessions is 
backgrounded.  In contrast, as noted earlier, Michelle’s obsessions are constructed with I as 
the subject (e.g. “I’m thinking”, lines 11 and 12), which acknowledges her own agency in the 
creation of her obsessions.    
 The compulsions that Matt describes in his narrative are mental strategies.  Unlike his 
obsessions that are depicted as created by his mind, his compulsive thoughts are positioned 
as created by his self. At lines 17-19, Matt states “unless I find a way of neutralising it/or 
tackling it/or getting rid of it”, which places I in the subject position. Matt therefore highlights 
his agency in producing compulsive thoughts but reduces his agency in producing obsessive 
thoughts. It is possible that Matt uses personification to distance those obsessions that he 
regards as undesirable from his ‘real’ or acceptable self.  This potential split between 
undesirable obsessions and an acceptable self is further constructed by Matt in the clauses 
“they [the thoughts] will somehow become part of what I actually believe” (line 15) and “it 
[the thought] will become embedded in my psyche” (line 21). Matt therefore constructs his 
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acceptable self as a contained entity whose boundaries are in need of protection from the 
threat of these undesirable obsessions. 
 Matt also uses the verb be when his thoughts and fears are in subject position (45.5%, 
n=5/11) (e.g. “the perennial fear is that…”, line 14; “it [the thought] is intrusive”, line 12) 
(Table 6).   While the mental and emotional entities are nominalisations, the verb be 
conjugated in present tense provides a general description rather than depicting an action.  
The focus here is not so much on the mental activity as an agent, but rather on representing 
a state of existence that is stable and unchanging. 
8. Discussion  
 
By analysing grammatical subjects that are the themes of clauses in narratives of OCD 
episodes, it has been shown that the self can be constructed in quite different ways in reactive 
and autogenous experiences, and that the differences in linguistic patterns could potentially 
shed light on the role of the self for different kinds of obsessions in OCD.  The findings may 
be useful for health professionals delivering talking, cognitive-based therapies for OCD as, by 
examining the entities placed in subject position at the beginning of clauses, it may be 
possible to see which entities the person with OCD is focussing on and potentially attributing 
agency to. The therapist and client could perhaps work collaboratively to examine this 
construction of the self and to re-position agency where it is felt to be problematic. Further 
considerations of implications for reactive and autogenous obsessions are discussed below.   
8.1. The self in reactive narratives 
Within the reactive narratives in this study, the self is positioned as a highly active agent.  By 
repeatedly constructing the self as performing physical actions, it is the self whose agency is 
foregrounded and it is this agency of the self that is emphasised in the role of both thought 
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creation and the monitoring of the surrounding environment.  It thus appears that, within 
reactive obsessions, a fear of what might happen or a fear of a fictive situation (O'Connor and 
Robillard, 1995) is often linguistically constructed with a focus on the role of the self’s physical 
actions in the creation of that situation. Clinical research on OCD has also emphasised the 
importance of a belief in one’s personal responsibility (OCCWG, 1997) and how a sense of 
responsibility is especially significant for people with checking compulsions (Foa et al., 2002).  
Positioning the self as in charge of one’s actions and thoughts could potentially be linked to a 
perception of the self as responsible for preventing harm or other negative outcomes. By 
extension, if feared outcomes do materialise, it is not inconceivable that the person could 
consider themselves as blameworthy (Ehntholt et al., 1999).   
 In therapy sessions, an elevated use of the self performing physical actions might 
signal to the therapist that their client is constructing themselves as agentive and responsible.  
Thus, one suggestion might be that the therapist and the client could work together to unpick 
this construction so that a sense of blame and guilt might be avoided or reduced. 
8.2. The self in autogenous narratives 
From the perspective of the IBA (Aardema and O'Connor, 2007), many participants  in this 
study (such as Matt) foreground a highly undesirable and fear-inducing self-as-could-be who 
holds values that are incongruent with their ‘real’ identity (Ferrier and Brewin, 2005).  
Obsessions about this self-as-could-be have been linked to negative appraisals of the self (Seo 
and Kwon, 2013) and so it is perhaps unsurprising that, in the autogenous narratives in the 
current study, the self is potentially distanced from obsessive thoughts through 
personification. By placing the mind and thoughts (and for some people, the disorder more 
broadly) as the grammatical subject of active voice constructions, these mental activities 
become agentive entities whose actions are constructed as relatively autonomous from the 
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self. The responsibility for the content of the thoughts is thus potentially transferred from the 
real self to these agentive mental entities. However, it must be noted that the suggestions 
made in this discussion are speculative and based on the findings of the current study, which 
has a small sample size.  Thus, further research would be required to test any claims about 
the possible functions of personification in OCD. 
 Like most people with OCD, people who experience autogenous obsessions generally 
recognise that their thoughts are their own (Aardema and O'Connor, 2007).  However, subject 
positioning of personified mental activities might be able to show the extent to which those 
undesirable thoughts are removed from the agency of the perceived real self.  Future studies 
could look at whether thoughts that are more threatening to self-perception are more likely 
to be represented through personification and distancing techniques.    
 As noted by Murphy and Perera-Delcourt (2012), many people with OCD are 
ambivalent towards letting go of OCD, particularly as the disorder may hold some perceived 
benefits, such as an increased sense of protection and control.  In a similar vein, it is possible 
that externalisation of the mind and thoughts might offer several ways of helping the person 
who has OCD to deal with their obsessions.    Firstly, placing the mind and thoughts outside 
of a contained self might perform a protective function by shielding the ‘true’, self-as-is from 
the fictive and dangerous self-as-could-be.  Secondly, personification of obsessive thoughts 
might allow the person some level of thought control, which is commonly strived for by 
people without overt compulsions (Purdon and Clark, 2002).  It may be the case that 
personification enables thought control by turning mental activities into entities that are 
tangible and, to some extent, malleable through compulsions.  However, it might be possible 
that any protection from and control over the feared self that may be offered by 
externalisation could lead to an ambivalence towards accepting mental activity as part of the 
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self as a unified whole. Again, these speculative claims would need further research, 
particularly using data collected from therapy sessions. 
 As a possible practical application of the findings, a high use of personification to 
describe mental activities in therapy sessions might alert the therapist to the client’s possible 
need and/or desire to create distance between their mental activities and their selves.  In 
instances where the client is hesitant to discuss the sensitive content of their obsessions, 
personification might signal thoughts that are highly distressing for the person and thus 
require distancing techniques as a form of protection or control.  The therapist and client 
could then work collaboratively to unravel the advantages and disadvantages of using 
externalisation, which might help the client to work out instances when externalisation may 
be problematic rather than beneficial for them.    
8.3. Summary of findings and implications 
Overall, the linguistic findings support the overlaps between the AR model and the IBA by 
demonstrating that narratives of reactive episodes recount how the actions of the self directly 
shape future, imagined scenarios, whereas narratives of autogenous episodes recount how 
the current self lives in fear of an unwanted self-as-could-be.  By way of summary, Table 7 
outlines the key linguistic differences and their possible implications for therapeutic practice 
between reactive and autogenous obsessions. 
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Table 7: Summary of key differences and implications for therapy 
Reactive Autogenous 
Potential focus on items/objects and other 
people in the surroundings by placing 
them as grammatical subject at the 
beginning of clauses. 
Potential focus on mental and emotional 
entities by placing them as grammatical 
subject at the beginning of clauses, with 
frequent use of personification. 
 
Self as performing physical actions 
(particularly to monitor and control the 
surroundings), leading to a construction of 
a highly active self. 
 
Self as performing cognitive processes 
(particularly to monitor and control 
unwanted thoughts) and being processes 
with less focus on physical actions. 
Self often positioned as creating 
obsessions. 
 
Mental entities often positioned as creating 
obsessions. 
In therapy, possible links to a sense of the 
self as responsible for future scenarios 
and, by extension, potentially 
blameworthy for negative outcomes. 
In therapy, possible links to a feared self-as-
could-be, with personification potentially 
used as a way of offering protection and 
thought control. 
 
 
8.4. Limitations and future directions 
The aim of this study was to focus on fine-grained analysis; thus, the sample size is small and 
cautions need to be taken when generalising to the wider population.  In order to verify the 
claims presented, further research could investigate subject positioning with participants who 
have been specifically recruited depending on the content of their obsessions.  Furthermore, 
the data were collected in research interviews and so an analysis of spoken data from therapy 
sessions may yield additional and alternative insights.  Finally, as the IBA does stress the 
importance of language and rhetorical devices, future studies could analyse a wider range of 
linguistic features within narratives of OCD.   
9. Conclusions 
 
Through a qualitative, linguistic analysis of subject positioning, this study has shown how the 
role of the self with OCD is constructed differently within narratives of autogenous and 
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reactive obsessions. Reactive narratives that describe a fear of an imagined situation tend to 
display a strong focus on the physical agency of the self, which potentially links to a perception 
of the self as responsible.  In contrast, autogenous narratives that describe a fear of an 
imagined self often position personified thoughts and the mind as the grammatical subject of 
active voice constructions, ascribing agency to these mental activities and creating distance 
from the ‘real’, authentic self.  This distancing technique possibly allows the person to protect 
the self that is experienced as real from a self that is experienced as undesirable and highly 
feared.  These findings could allow therapists and other health professionals working with 
people with OCD to identify the entities that the person is focussing on and to explore their 
constructions of a sense of self.  
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